Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards via spatial interactions (Supporting Information)

Main content

Dirk Helbing1,2,3 Attila Szolnoki4 Matjaž Perc5 György Szabó4

1 ETH Zurich, Chair of Sociology, Universitätstr. 41, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland

2 Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA

3 Collegium Budapest - Institute for Advanced Study

4 Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary

5 Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia

Movie SV1: Indirect territorial battle between cooperators (blue) and moralists (green) in the presence of defectors (red).

Movie SV1
Indirect territorial battle between cooperators (blue) and moralists (green) in the presence of defectors (red). The computer simulation of the public goods game with punishment is performed for a grid of size LxL=100x100, where the synergy factor of cooperation is r=4.4, the punishment fine β=0.1, and the punishment cost is γ=0.1. For a detailed discussion of the spatio-temporal dynamics see the main manuscript, particularly Fig. 2.

 

Movie SV2: Temporal evolution of a coexistence between defectors (red) and cooperators (blue) for the parameter values r=4.4, β=0.1, and γ=0.3.
Movie SV3: Symbiosis of moralists (green) and immoralists (yellow), who jointly defeat defectors (red).

Movie SV3
Symbiosis of moralists (green) and immoralists (yellow), who jointly defeat defectors (red). The computer simulation is performed for a grid of size LxL=100x100, where the synergy factor of cooperation is r=3.5, the punishment fine is β=0.12, and the punishment cost is γ=0.005. For a detailed discussion of the spatio-temporal dynamics see the main manuscript, particularly Fig. 3.

 
 
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Thu Mar 23 01:21:10 CET 2017
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